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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show that Keynes’s concept of probability
can enrich the understanding of the process of introduction of innovation
offered by the Neo-Schumpeterian approach. Keynes’s theory of probability
can complete the set of tools required to understand the decision process of
whether or not to introduce an innovation mainly by complementing the
notion of routines.
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Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que o conceito keynesiano de proba-
bilidade pode contribuir para o entendimento do processo de introdução de ino-
vações tal qual explicado pela abordagem neo-Schumpeteriana. A teoria da pro-
babilidade de Keynes tem o potencial de completar a caixa de ferramentas neces-
sária para analisar a decisão sobre introduzir ou não uma inovação, principal-
mente ao complementar a idéia de rotinas.
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to show that Keynes’s concept of probability can
enrich the understanding of the process of introduction of innovation
offered by the Neo-Schumpeterian approach. The latter has a peculiar
understanding of the technical change process, which includes concepts
such as knowledge base, cumulativeness, technological paradigm,
technological trajectory, and uncertainty. To deal with this uncertainty
Neo-Schumpeterians introduce the concept of routines. What is
suggested here is that the concepts of Probable Knowledge and Weight
of Argument, drain from Keynes’s theory of probability, when used
together with the concept of routines, can clarify the rationality of the
decision-making process in the introduction of an innovation. In section
1, the main features of Keynes’s probability and the concept of probable
knowledge are presented. In section 2, I describe those aspects of the
Neo-Schumpeterian approach to technology that are important for our
discussion. The possible links between these approaches are discussed
in section 3.  Finally, section 4 concludes with suggestions for further
development.
1. Keynesian Uncertainty
The concept of uncertainty in Keynes has been a subject of debate since
the publication of the General Theory. Initially, the main feature of this
discussion was the distinction between “risk” and “uncertainty”2. While
the Neoclassical approach argued that only situations of risk were
analytically tractable in economic analysis, e.g. Lucas, heterodox
schools – especially the Post-Keynesians – maintained that economic
analysis should not neglect ‘true’ uncertainty. However, since the early
years of the 1980’s the debate has changed. Despite the fact that the
previous distinction still remains, within the heterodox field a discussion
about the existence or not of Keynes’s concept of uncertainty in the
Treatise on Probability and its link to the General Theory has emerged
(Carabelli 1985, 1988, 1992, 1995; O’Donnell 1989, 1990; Lawson 1985,
1988; Runde 1990, 1991, among others). Thus, we think that it is
important to look at the Treatise on Probability before we define what is
understood here as Keynesian uncertainty3.
2 This distinction first arises in Knight’s works (1921:20): “It will appear that a measurable
uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one
that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly restrict the term ‘uncertainty’
to the cases of the non-quantitative type”.
3 We will not discuss Keynes’s theory of probability in its details as this discussion has already
been done by other scholars. For the present we will only make a brief presentation of the general
ideas.
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For Keynes, probability is about logical relations between sets of
propositions, premisses and conclusions. Let the conclusions be the set
of propositions a, and the set of premisses, h. If a knowledge of h justifies
a rational belief in a of some degree, one can say that there is a probability
relation between a and h. This relation can be written as: a/h.
The probability relation or the degree a of rational belief that it entails
ranges from a situation of certainty (a/h = 1), meaning that the
relationship between a and h is tautologic, to a situation of impossibility
(a/h = 0), where a and h are contradictory. A situation where 0 < a/h <
1, means that the probability relation warrants, a degree of belief
intermediate between 0 and 1. Moreover, the probability relation is
defined solely in terms of the relation between the conclusion and the
premisses. If, after establishing a probability relation of type a/h, new
evidence h
1
 appears, this does not invalidate the previous probability
relation, but gives rise to a new one: a/hh
1
. An important feature of
Keynes’s theory of probability is that not all probability relations can be
numerically measurable.
What is important is that in Keynes’s approach probability is a branch of
logic. As pointed out by Carabelli (1988:18), “Keynes’s logic of probability
appealed to those categories traditionally associated with the theory of
belief, opinion, limited knowledge, logical doubt and ignorance, i.e.
uncertainty and probability.” Logic in this sense is not restricted to
demonstrative knowledge or truth relations. According to Keynes,
probability arguments, in general, are non-demonstrative and non-
conclusive and thereby generally opposed to Cartesian/Euclidean mode
of thought. Moreover, this logic is “non-demonstrative because it
referred to organic relations that would not be amenable to formal
representation” (Dow 1996:7)4.
An interesting way to represent Keynes’s theory of probability is
suggested by Koopman (1940). In this article, he defines the axioms and
the algebra of intuitive probability, and he identifies Keynes’s theory of
probability as a case of intuitive probability. The intuitive thesis in
probability grasps that probability derives directly from the intuition,
both in its meaning and in the majority of laws which it obeys. Contrary
to the common use of probability, the intuitive approach claims that
experience should be interpreted in terms of probability and not the
inverse. Thus, intuition comes prior to objective experience. The main
aphorism of this thesis is that “knowledge is possible, while certainty is
not” (Koopman 1940:269, italics added).
4 According to Dow (1996:15): “An organic system involves interdependencies which preclude
the selection of one set of axioms as universally causal; it also involves interdependencies which
are complex and evolutionary, and thus not amenable to formalization with respect to separable
elements within a single system of reasoning.”
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The importance of the intuitive probability to our discussion is that it
simplifies the conditions for the comparability between probabilities,
without discrediting the main aspects of Keynes’s interpretation.
According to Koopman (1940, p. 270), “the fundamental view point of
the [intuitive probability] is the primal intuition of probability expres-









 be propositions, where the meaning is perceived by
an individual that does not know whether this apprehension is true or
false.
Then the phrase “[a
1
] on the presumption that [h
1
] is true is equally or
less probable than [a
2
] on the presumption that [h
2
] is true” conveys a
precise meaning to his intuition. (…) That is, (…) a first essential in the
thesis of intuitive probability, and contains the ultimate answer to
the question of the meaning of the notion of probability (Koopman
1 9 4 0 : 2 7 0 ) .











This is precisely the kind of comparison that Keynes discusses in the
Treatise on Probability. So, hereafter we will use the above symbolic
form to describe Keynes’s approach.
Another important element on the Keynes approach is the concept of
weight of argument. Keynes’s main concern in discussing probability is
to show that one can act rationally in situations where complete certainty
about the future is absent. In these situations one should look not only
at the probability relation but also at the size of the evidence – evidential
spread – that supports this probability. Here Keynes brings in to
discussion the concept of weight of argument.
According to Runde (1991), it is possible to find in the Treatise a relative
definition of weight, as it is referred to the degree of completeness of the
information set on which a probability is based. It is the balance between
the amount of relevant knowledge in relation to the relevant knowledge









5 Where “≥ * is the qualitative probability relation ‘at least as probable as’ ” (Runde 1997:223).
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where: K
r
 is the relevant knowledge and
I
r
 is the relevant ignorance.
Two aspects deserve more attention. The first one is related to the
meaning of “relevant ignorance”. As insightfully pointed out by Runde
(1991), it is always possible to know, or at least identify, the factors that
affect our probability relation, and about which one is ignorant.
Secondly, more information does not necessary mean an increase on
the weight of argument. New evidence could decrease the weight if it
implies the increase of relevant ignorance. A new piece of evidence can
show that our previous relevant knowledge was wrong – decreasing the
weight – albeit, simultaneously, the apprehension of the relevant
ignorance is increasing.
Finally, it is well known that Keynes assumes a direct relationship between
weight and confidence in using the probability estimate as a guide to
conduct. The definition of weight as a degree of completeness of
information is helpful to the understanding of this relationship.
Confidence can either decrease or increase with new information, because
new evidence can increase the relevant ignorance or knowledge.
It is important to note that the Keynes approach to probability and the
concept of weight allow a definition of a different kind of knowledge, that
is probable knowledge. It is that kind of knowledge that is obtained
from the possibility of establishing a probability relation and from the
information set that grounds it. It is a knowledge that emerges in
situations of true uncertainty and it is different from the probabilistic
knowledge. The latter is that knowledge that comes out in situations
where the use of probability distributions is possible, in other words,
situations of risk.
These two main aspects of the Treatise – probability relation and weight
of argument – have been used by some scholars (Runde 1990; Dow 1996)
to define uncertainty in a Keynesian sense and, in addition, to
demonstrate that Keynesian uncertainty admits degrees. Runde (1991,
1990) argues that uncertainty, according to Keynes’s approach, could
be related to the size, in some sense, of the information set upon which
the probability relation is based. In other words, uncertainty can be
related to the weight of argument if the latter is defined as a degree of
completeness of information on which a probability is based. Despite
the fact that this notion is not fully explored in the Treatise, Runde gives
two quotations from The General Theory that support his claim that
uncertainty can be related to the weight of argument:
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The state of long-term expectations, upon which our decisions are
based, does not solely depend, therefore, on the most probable forecast
we can make. It also depends on the confidence with which we make
this forecast – on how highly we rate the likelihood of our forecast
turning out quite wrong (C.W. VII:148).
And:
The liquidity-premium, it will be observed, is partly similar to the
risk-premium, but partly different; - the difference corresponding to
the difference between the best estimates we can make of probabilities
and the confidence with which we make them (C.W. VII:240).
It is clear from the previous quotations that confidence is the essential
factor in this interpretation of uncertainty. As it was shown above, the
concept of weight, as a degree of completeness of information, appears
to be the best one to capture the role of ignorance on the assessment of
the confidence on the probability relation. As a consequence of this
approach, the complete absence of probable knowledge should be
interpreted as the extreme case of uncertainty. If it is impossible to
establish the probability relation, whatever the reason – no existence of
probability or lack of skill to determine or identify it –, it is also impossible
the existence of any confidence. Thus, this situation could be interpreted
as an extreme case not only for uncertainty, but also for confidence.
From this extreme position, one can move to situations where
uncertainty prevails due to low weight of argument, which implies low
confidence. Thus, there is a qualitative change in the uncertainty, from
a situation of which a probability relation does not exist to another one
in which probability relation exists but the weight is low. Moreover, as
the weight of argument is increasing, the confidence follows in the same
direction and the uncertainty decreases. In this approach, probable
knowledge is taken into account as a guide to conduct, and the degree of
reliability of this probable knowledge – the confidence it  merits – deter-
mines the degree of uncertainty that exists in a specific situation.
Therefore, the concept of weight allows the understanding of uncertainty
as a relative concept.
Dow (1995) goes further in the development of the concept of degrees of
uncertainty. She argues that to take weight into account in defining
uncertainty, one must bring to consideration the knowledge of what
constitutes relevance. To do this, it is necessary to have  a “degree of
belief in a hypothesised structure on which to base an estimate weight”
(Dow 1995: 124). In other words, a degree of belief that there is a logical
relation between the hypothesis (a) and the evidence that bears it (h).
This is important for to identify relevance it is necessary to believe that
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the relationship between (a) and (h) is known. The main point here is to
note that there is a difference between the acknowledgement that it is
possible to establish a logical relation between a and h, and to define in
what extent the size and quality of h allows the conclusion a. One has
now two orders of uncertainty that work together. First, there is
uncertainty about the probability relation. As she precisely pointed out,
it is a case of ‘uncertainty about uncertainty’. Uncertainty now is
inversely related to a lower order of knowledge of the probability relation
relative to ignorance of relevant evidence and ignorance. Second, there
is uncertainty about the degree of completeness of information on which
a probability is based.  From this perspective, the limit situation is that
one where knowledge about the probability relation is absent and
ignorance is complete6.
Summing up this section, we think that we could define Keynesian
uncertainty as that situations in which decision-makers do not have
access to numerically definite probabilities, whatever it is7. Under this
definition of uncertainty, it is possible to explain qualitatively different
situations. Both, the extreme situation of uncertainty – complete absence
of probable knowledge, whatever the reason –, and the situation of
probable knowledge, where weight is interpreted as a measure of
gradability of uncertainty fit the definition above, eluding any confusion.
Qualitative degrees of uncertainty can be visualised in table 1.
TABLE 1 - SCALE OF QUALITATIVE DEGREES UNCERTAINTY
6 However, this situation is admitted as not feasible: “As uncertainty is compounded at higher
recursive levels, our necessary conceptual structures become complex, counterintuitive and
involuted to the point that they collapse under their own weight. Put in another way, absolute
ignorance is incompatible with knowledge of absolute uncertainty” (Dow 1995: 124).







lackof skill to recognise(a/h)
lowdegreeof belief in (a/h) and low
weight
highdegreeof belief in (a/h) and low
weight
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2.  Technical change and uncertainty
Until the second half of the 1970’s most of the economic literature
relating to technical change was divided into two groups according to
their understanding of the nature of an innovation: the so-called demand
pull and technology push approaches. The basic difference between them
depends on what is viewed as the main source of innovation: the former
attributes to market mechanisms the unique determinant of technical
change and the latter postulates the state of science as the main source
of innovation8. However, by the end of the 1970’s a number of authors
(Rosenberg 1976; Nelson & Winter 1977, among others) started to argue
that an intermediate approach could be found. In other words, they
believe that neither the demand-pull nor the technology push approach
could alone provide the elements for the full comprehension of the
technological change process. This group will be named here Neo-
Schumpeterian (hereafter NS), as they find in Schumpeter’s writings the
inspiration for their analyses9.
An important feature of the innovative activity according to the NS is
the uncertainty. It plays an essential role in the understanding of
technical change by the NS approach. According to Freeman and Soete
(1997:242-5), there are three kinds of uncertainty that affect the
innovative activity: business, technical and market uncertainties. The
first one is related to environmental variables (political, economic, le-
gal, etc.) and affects all decisions related to the future. This kind of
uncertainty is not specific to the innovative activity, but to economic
decisions as a whole. The other two kinds of uncertainty are project-
specific. Technical uncertainty refers to realised standards of
performance under various operating conditions for a given expenditure
on R&D, while market uncertainty refers to the extent to which the
innovation will be commercially successful for a given product
specification (Kay 1979:18).
Despite the fact that these categories of uncertainty appear in every
innovation, their degree varies according to the type of innovation.
Freeman and Soete (1997:244) show that there is a qualitative difference
between the uncertainty associated with a radical product innovation,
which is of very high degree, and that related to the introduction of a
product differentiation, which is of a much lower degree (Table 2). This
difference in the degree of uncertainty is related to the development of
8 For a review about the critics to these approaches see Dosi 1982.
9 This group is also called evolutionary or institutionalist. However, as theses labels have been
used to classify theoretical approaches which cover more than technological aspects of the eco-
nomic system, we prefer to use the label neo-schumpeterian as the main concern of the essay is
technical change.
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technological paradigm and technological trajectories (hereafter TP and
TT respectively), in a sense that they focus the direction of search and
give better grounds for the formation of technological and market
expectations (cf. Dosi 1988: 1134)10.
TABLE 2 - DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY ASSOCIATED WITH VARIOUS TYPES
OF INNOVATION
Source: Freeman and Soete, 1997:244.
Notwithstanding the fact that these degrees of uncertainty are related to
different aspects of the innovative activity, they have the same basic
sources. According to Dosi & Egidi (1991:145) the sources of uncertainty
are:
incompleteness of the information set, which means the lack of all the
information which would be necessary to make decisions with certain
outcomes and knowledge incompleteness, which means the inability of
the agents to recognise and interpret the relevant information
(limitations on the computational and cognitive capabilities of the
agents).
When related to the introduction of an innovation, the first source
(incompleteness of the information set) means that when someone starts
to search for a solution for a technological problem, he/she lacks some
fundamental information, and this lack of information makes the
1 0 It is important to note that although uncertainty can be reduced, it is never eliminated. Ac-
cording to Dosi (1988:1134), “even when the fundamental knowledge base and the expected direc-
tions of advance are fairly well known, it is still often the case that one must first engage in explor-
atory research, development, and design before knowing what the outcome will be (…) and what
some manageable results will cost, or, indeed, whether very useful results will emerge” (Mansfield
et al. 1977).
1 True uncertainty Fundamental research
Fundamental invention
2 Very high degree of uncertainty Radical product innovations
Radical process innovations outside firm
3 High degree of uncertainty Major product innovations
Radical process innovations in own establishment or system
4 Moderate uncertainty New ‘generations’ established products
5 Little uncertainty Licensed innovation
Imitation of product innovations
Modifications of products and processes
Early adoption of established process
6 Very little uncertainty New ‘model’
Product differentiation
Agency for established innovation
Late adoption of established process innovation and franchised
operations in own establishment
Minor technical improvements
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innovative activity completely uncertain. This information might
include, for example, the length of time that it will take for the innovation
to be found; the cost of this innovation; and its acceptance by the market.
One is, therefore, faced with strong uncertainty, which means the
impossibility, even in principle, of defining the probability distribution
of future events (cf. Dosi & Egidi 1991). Thus, the innovative activity is
not an activity subject to risk but to true uncertainty.
The second source (knowledge incompleteness) is based on the concept
of procedural uncertainty. There is here a clear distinction between
knowledge and information. Access to the latter does not guarantee the
acquisition of the former. The acquisition of knowledge lies in the ability
to process information, and the latter depends on the computational
and cognitive capabilities of the agents. Therefore, uncertainty here has
its source on the lack of knowledge, despite the fact that information
could be available. To deal with this uncertainty the agents develop a
“rational behaviour”, which implies the search for stable rules and
procedures (routines), which give the agent some security to face
uncertainty.
The use of routines in innovative activity may sound a little odd as
innovation represents something new. However, there is no
contradiction in this approach. What should be clear is the difference
between the “search” for an innovation and the outcomes of this
“search”11. The uncertainty relates to the outcomes of the research
activity and not to this activity itself. One could correctly argue that at
initial stages of the research activity the uncertainty is strong.
Nevertheless, as some knowledge becomes consolidated or, in other
words, as some heuristics has been established, one could assume strong
patterns (routines) of a high predictability in the research activity. The
words of Nelson and Winter (1982:133) synthesise the point:
We propose to assimilate to our concept of routine all of the patterning
of organizational activity that the observance of heuristics produces,
including the patterning of particular ways of attempting to innovate.
(…) But we emphasize, (…), that viewing innovative activity as
“routine” in this sense does not entail treating its results as
predictable 12.
1 1 In Nelson and Winter words: “(…) the relationship of routine behaviour to innovation is cen-
tered on a simple distinction between organizational activity directed to innovation (or problem-
solving more generally) and the results of such activity” (1982:132).
12 Nelson and Winter give an illustrative example: (…) the case of systematic sequential search
of a well-defined population for an element with attributes that makes it the solution to a well-
defined problem. When and whether a solution will be found may be quite uncertain, but the
search itself follows a routine with a simple structure: select element, test for desired attributes,
terminate with success if attributes are present, select next element if they are not (1982:132).
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By placing the discussion in the terms discussed before, one can say that
the research routines codify the procedures and knowledge involved in
the solution of a particular problem, and are conditioned by the
technological paradigm13.
To sum up, the NS approach to technical change assumes that substantive
and procedural uncertainties are essential features of the innovative
activity and, in order to deal with them, routines are developed. These
routines, in turn, are contingent on the competences and heuristics of
the technological paradigm, which allows the emergence of the concepts
of appropriability, opportunity and cumulativeness, making the
understanding of the technical change unique. Moreover, it was shown
that uncertainty varies according to different types of innovation,
decreasing from a situation in which there is a high degree of uncertainty
– usually in research activities – to situations with a low degree of
uncertainty – development activities.
The question to be raised here is whether routines are sufficient to
understand the decision to introduce and/or develop an innovation.
My claim is that it is not. Routinesed behaviour is not only a characteristic
of the innovative activity, but rather it is present in every situation of
human life. Indeed, some authors (Farmer 1995; Giddens 1984; Lawson
1997) argue that it is an important element of human action. It is related
not only to situations of uncertainty but it is essential to both facilitate
the interactions between individuals and give “ontological security”
(sense of stability and sameness) to human beings.
Thus, as a part of today situations, routines cannot by themselves alone
explain the behaviour of the innovator faced with uncertainty. They are
part of this behaviour and must be taken into consideration, nonetheless
they are insufficient to provide a full understanding of it. As pointed out
by Fransman,
[w]hile the routine-based approach does not assume certainty, it does
not deal adequately with the way in which uncertainty is confronted
in decision making in the firm (1998:175).
In technical change’s case, routines as defined by the technological
paradigm and technological trajectories reduce but do not eliminate
the uncertainty. They are fundamental in a problem-solving activity
since they help in
1 3 The concept of path-dependency is very useful in grasping why these routines are conditioned
by the technological paradigm. For a discussion of this point, see David (1985) and Rosenberg (1994).
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the identification of relevant information, the application of pre-
existing competences or the development of new ones to the problem
solution and, finally the identification of the alternative courses of
action (Dosi & Egidi 1991:150).
However, the last act of a problem-solving activity (choice) under
uncertainty remains to be made. That is to say, which course of action
should be taken by the agent? What is it that makes an investor decide
between the immediate introduction of an innovation or postponing it?
To answer these questions, we think that the use of Keynes’s theory
probability can be helpful, as it is related to the decision-making process
under uncertainty.
3. Analysing the introduction of innovation using
 Keynes’ probability
The discussion made in sections 1 and 2 above shows that there is an
important element linking the NS approach to innovation and Keynes’s
theory on probability, that is, the decision making under uncertainty.
As shown, uncertainty is an irreducible element in innovative activity.
It is always present when some technological solution is sought.
Moreover, Keynes’s theory of probability tries to explain how rational
behaviour can emerge within an uncertain environment. Thus, in this
section we attempt to interpret the introduction of innovations using
the concepts of technological paradigm, technological trajectories and
probable knowledge.
The first aspect to be analysed is the uncertainty. To make the argument
clearer, we first analyse the effects of technological and market
uncertainty on the innovative decision, assuming that the business
uncertainty is very low at this point. By the end of the chapter, business
uncertainty is incorporated into the argument.
As shown in section 2, for the NS innovative activity involves two sources
of uncertainty: the incompleteness of the information set and knowledge
incompleteness. However, it is worth noting that these two sources of
uncertainty fit well with the definition of Keynesian uncertainty
discussed before. The incompleteness of the information set is nothing
more than a problem of  low weight. What is missing in the information
set is the relevant knowledge about the innovation. Moreover, the
acknowledgement of the existence of relevant ignorance creates
uncertainty. The lack of information discussed above is not a problem of
imperfect information, but it reflects the fact that the future is unknown
and unknowable. The impossibility of knowing a priori the length of
time that it will take for the innovation to be found; the cost of this
125Revista de Economia, v. 32, n. 2 (ano 30), p. 113-134, jul./dez. 2006. Editora UFPR
CROCCO, M. The future’s unknowability:...
innovation; its acceptance by the market, all have the same nature, as
e.g. the impossibility of knowing a priori “the price of copper and the
rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new
invention”, as Keynes pointed out (C.W. Vol. XIV). Moreover, knowledge
incompleteness can also be interpreted either as a situation of lack of
skill in recognising the main probability relation (a/h). The specification
of the sources of uncertainty by the NS approach only helps to
understand the different degrees of uncertainty associated with different
innovations. However, from a theoretical point of view, the Keynesian
approach, being more comprehensive, is capable of encompassing the
NS approach to uncertainty. Thus, as a starting point to the discussion
here proposed, we think that the use of Keynesian uncertainty can
provide new insights to the analysis of technical change.
The second aspect to be analysed is the knowledge used in an innovative
activity. There are important contributions from the NS that help
understanding this aspect. First of all, one has to keep in mind that there
are different types of innovation with different degrees of uncertainty
(Freeman & Soete 1997; Kay 1979). Roughly speaking, the most
important difference is between radical and incremental innovations,
where the former is based on completely new knowledge and the latter
on pre-existing knowledge.
The decision-making process related to radical or incremental
innovation will differ according to the role of the previous knowledge.
Here the concepts of technological paradigm and technological
trajectory are very helpful contributions by the NS. One can, in a
simplified manner, identify the introduction of a new TP as a radical
innovation, and the development of one of many possible TTs as a process
of incremental innovation. Therefore, in the case of radical innovation,
the knowledge (premisse) that will be used as a ground for the innovation
decision is limited and extremely weak, and the future response of the
market is very uncertain. In other words, there is a low reliability on the
evidence that is used to decide whether to introduce an innovation. On
the other hand, the incremental innovation is based on existing
knowledge, defined by the TP. Moreover, as one develops along a TT,
the introduction of successive incremental innovations result in the
accumulation of knowledge and so the premise for the decision becomes
better founded.
One of the most important kinds of knowledge is tacit knowledge – that
knowledge that comes from experience but is not codified in manuals or
books. Tacitness is a fundamental factor in the cumulative aspect of the
innovative activity. As one moves along a TT, one’s knowledge increases
for two reasons: (i) the innovator improves his/her understanding of
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the technology that he/she is using14; (ii) also, he/she improves
knowledge about market behaviour in relation to this previous
innovation. Thus, there is a learning process, which is similar to the
learning process that is implicit in Keynes’s theory of probability. What
is changing in this process is the weight, defined as the degree of
completeness of the information set. A successful move through the TT
increases the relevant knowledge about the technology and the market
behaviour in relation to this specific technology and, simultaneously,
decreases the relevant ignorance. As a consequence, the state of
confidence in the success of the introduction of a new innovation becomes
greater.
Moreover, at each improvement of a product/equipment the set of
premises is increasing, and as the past innovations have been
successfully introduced, the new premises work to increase the probable
knowledge about the success of the introduction of a new innovation.
This approach helps understanding the different degrees of uncertainty
associated with different kinds of innovation.
As said before, probable knowledge can be seen as a guide in situations
where uncertainty prevails, and the degree of reliability in this probable
knowledge – confidence – determines the degree of uncertainty that
exists in a specific situation. In the case of the development of a
technological trajectory, one can see that the probable knowledge about
the success of the introduction of an innovation is increasing and so the
reliability on this probable knowledge as a guide to conduct increases as
well. Thus, confidence is increasing and the degree of uncertainty
decreasing.
However, there are situations in which the introduction of an innovation
is not successful or the search for technological solutions leads to a
creation of a new knowledge that increases the uncertainty about the
future15. In these cases, the relevant ignorance is increasing due to
ignorance about market conditions (meaning the acceptance of the
innovation) or due to ignorance about the technology itself. In both
cases, the weight is decreasing and so the confidence. Thus, the degree
of uncertainty increases and may either determine a change on the
technological trajectory or show the need for more research in the same
trajectory. In any case, these situations imply a decrease in the
confidence in the introduction of the next innovation.
14 Remember that technology is never a free good. The technological solution for one specific
problem is always constrained by the technical characteristics of the technological paradigm, and
these characteristics are not known ex-ante.
1 5 This is very common in situations where new knowledge contradicts previous knowledge taken
for granted.
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What has so far been discussed can be formalised in the following way.
The main question faced by the innovator when deciding whether or not
to develop and introduce an innovation is about the profitability of the
innovation. In Keynes’s probability terms, the question is: What is the
reliability on the success of the introduction of an innovation




 =  conclusion: “the innovation g
j
 will be profitable”, where:
j = technological age of the innovation;
if g
j 
is a radical innovation, then j = 1;
if g
j 
is an incremental innovation, then j > 1;
h
j
 = set of premises when the innovator is deciding whether or not to
develop and introduce an innovation j;
basically h
j
 is the knowledge about the variables that affect the
investment decision, including the knowledge about the technical
characteristics of the new innovation, the knowledge of the outcome
(successful or not) of the introduction of the innovation g
j-1
, or, in







) =is the weight of argument related to the development and
introduction of an innovation j; V
j 
means the relevant
knowledge and relevant ignorance about the technological
trajectory in relation to its potential frontier.
Thus, what one wants to know is whether the existent probable knowledge
is a reliable guide, in other words, the probable knowledge about “a”
(success) for the innovation g, which has a technological age of j.
Now, one has to try to analyse the question put above in such a way as to
incorporate the concepts of technological paradigm and technological
trajectory. Table 3 below can help understanding this process. It
incorporates tables 1 and 2 and introduces some elements of Keynes’s
theory of probability. Following Dow’s approach, let us call the
probability relation ag/h the structure. At the beginning of the
development of the trajectory, probable knowledge does not exist due
to either the absence of the probability relation or the lack of skill to
recognise it. This is the extreme case of uncertainty and animal spirits
or institutional factors will determine the decision of whether developing
the trajectory.
A qualitative change occurs when one moves from stage 1 to stage 2. A
previous fundamental discovery has been made and thus, it is possible
now to recognise the probability relation, despite the fact that some
degree of uncertainty about it exists (this explains the low order of
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 ). In this case, the weight of argument
is very low due to the acknowledgement of the relevant ignorance that
exists in this phase. Both the technological knowledge and the market
responses to the innovation are very weak and so the degree of
uncertainty is very high.
When the major innovations start, the knowledge about the structure
has already been established, but the relevant ignorance is still greater
than the relevant knowledge and so a high degree of uncertainty prevails.
What it is important here is to understand the occurrence of three pro-
cesses:
a) after introducing the innovation g
2
, the investor goes through a
process of learning, which creates tacit knowledge about the
innovation. This allows him/her to increase his/her
understanding about the possible future improvements in the
innovation;
b) as this knowledge is in some extent tacit, the technological
asymmetries between the investor and his/her competitors
increase, increasing thus confidence that he/she will not be
superseded by another competitor with a better innovation;
c) as the innovation g
2
 was introduced with success – it has been
accepted by the market – the investor becomes more confident
about the possibility of success of the incremental innovation g
3
.
These processes operate to increase the weight for the next innovation,
decreasing the degree of uncertainty attached to each innovation. At
the end of the trajectory (product differentiation) the relevant knowledge
– technological and economic viability – is very well established and
there is a very low degree of uncertainty. A good example of this situation
is the computer industry nowadays. For the firms that are well established
in the market, the uncertainty inherent to the decision about the
introduction of a new generation of personal computer is very little due
to the relevant knowledge these firms possess.
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TABLE 3 - TYPES OF INNOVATION AND DEGREES OF UNCERTAINTY
The process of development of a technological trajectory discussed
above represents a case of a successful trajectory. However, as said
before, an innovator can also be surprised by the introduction of a
product with better technology, or the research process may show that
the relevant ignorance is bigger than it was initially supposed. The
innovator’s response in this situation will depend on whether the new
technology introduced by the competitor and/or the outcome of the
research process represents a change on the technological paradigm. A
change of the TP will affect not only the weight, but also the knowledge
about the structure. There is no alternative for the investor other than
to change his/her trajectory. If there is no change on TP, there is no
modification on the knowledge about the structure but the weight
decreases in any way. In this case, two things can happen: either the
innovator allocates more effort on the research process to improve the
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K5 < K6 > I6
ag6/h6 > ag5/h5 6 : Very little
uncertainty
6 < 5
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One important aspect to determine what decision should be made is the
position of the innovator inside the trajectory. The further he/she is on
the technological trajectory (or the nearer he/she is of phase 6), the
more difficult is to change trajectory.
The question to be raised here is the following: In what extent does the
use of probable knowledge improve the description of the decision-
process related to the introduction of an innovation? Part of the answer
has been given before, as it was argued that routines are insufficient to
deal with the last act on a problem-solving activity, that is, the final
choice in each problem-solving process. However, it remains to be
considered the role of probable knowledge (and weight of argument) in
dealing with all aspects of the uncertainty inherent to the innovative
activity.
Although the discussion made so far in this section was mainly concerned
with technical and market uncertainties, a full account of the decision to
introduce an innovation warrants the analysis of business uncertainty
as well. As an investment decision, the introduction of an innovation
has to deal with all aspects of this decision which are not only affected
by technological and market factors, but also by the investors’
perception about the economic environment as a whole.
The weight of argument in this case should not be viewed as incorporating
only the relevant knowledge and ignorance related to technological and
market problems, but also the relevant knowledge and ignorance about
all aspects that affect the investment decision. In this sense, the increase
of technological knowledge about a technological trajectory does not
necessarily increase the probable knowledge about the success of the
introduction of an innovation if the business ignorance was increased
by some other reason. In this case, even when walking along a successful
technological trajectory, a decision about the introduction of an
innovation may be postponed.
4. Conclusion
We think that the ideas outlined above could represent a possible link
between the NS approach to technical change and Keynes’s theory of
probability. First, the NS approach to innovation stresses the importance
of uncertainty as a feature always present in the innovative activity,
which can never be eliminated. To deal with this uncertainty NS theorists
developed the concept of routines.
Moreover, the concept of technology used by this approach sheds light
on features such as cumulativeness, appropriability and knowledge base,
131Revista de Economia, v. 32, n. 2 (ano 30), p. 113-134, jul./dez. 2006. Editora UFPR
CROCCO, M. The future’s unknowability:...
which are incorporated in the concepts of technological paradigm and
technological trajectory. These factors shape the routines that are used
by the firms.
However, as the uncertainty is never eliminated, routines themselves
are not sufficient to explain the decision-making process during the
introduction of an innovation. They explain the use of the premises used
in this process, but they do not explain the logical development of this
choice. A decision remains to be made: whether to introduce an
innovation or not?
At this point, we have tried to show that Keynes’s theory of probability
can complete the set of tools required to understand that process. From
the use of Keynes’s probability it is clear that this process can be seen as
rational, despite the fact that one may never know for certain whether
the innovation will be a success. The concepts of probable knowledge
and weight of argument are the key factors in the understanding of the
rationality that is behind the development of a technological trajectory.
Routines embody the accumulated knowledge, and they are constrained
by the TP. The learning process that occurs during the continuous
innovative activity weakens the influence of some sources of the
uncertainty related to the investment process. The basis on which
successive decisions to introduce innovation are found becomes more
grounded as both weight of argument (state of confidence) and the
probable knowledge increase, driving the formation of the expectation
in the same direction.
Thus, one can say that routines form the premises (h) upon which the
decision is taken. Based on these routines, a probable knowledge on the
success of the introduction of the innovation can be established, and as
new routines are developed, as a result of the innovative process, the
weight of argument changes.
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